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In this paper, we model the supply and demand for agricultural goods and assess and compare 
how welfare, land use and biodiversity are affected under intensive and extensive farming 
systems at market equilibrium instead of at exogenous production levels. As long as demand 
is responsive to price, and intensive farming has lower production costs, there exists a 
rebound effect (larger market size) of intensive farming. Intensive farming is then less 
beneficial to biodiversity than extensive farming, except when there is a high degree of 
convexity between biodiversity and yield. On the other hand, extensive farming leads to 
higher prices and smaller quantities for consumers. Depending on parameter values, it may 
increase or decrease agricultural producer profits. Implementing “active” land sparing by 
zoning some land for agriculture and other land for conservation could overcome the rebound 
effect of intensive farming, but we show that farmers have then incentives to encroach on land 
zoned for conservation, with higher incentives under intensive farming. We also show that the 
primary effect of the higher prices associated with extensive farming is a reduction of animal 
feed production, which has a higher price elasticity of demand, whereas less of an effect is 
observed on plant-based food production and almost no effect is observed on biofuel 
production if there are mandatory blending policies.  
 







There is now abundant evidence showing a loss of global biodiversity [1, 2], and 
agriculture is a major cause of these losses [3, 4] because of its spatial expansion [5] and 
intensification [6]. This trend is expected to continue with the ever-increasing demand for 
agricultural food, feed, fiber, and energy that is projected for the coming decades [7, 8]. Based 
on the unequivocal evidence that a loss of biodiversity can affect ecosystem functioning, 
productivity, and resilience as well as biogeochemical cycles [9, 10], alleviating the impact of 
agriculture on biodiversity is a major concern for human societies. 
An important part of the scientific and political debate on biodiversity and agriculture in 
the past decade has revolved around discussions, analyses, applications, and extensions of the 
land sparing versus land sharing framework proposed by Green et al. [11]. These authors have 
reinvestigated the “Borlaug hypothesis,” in which yield-increasing technologies (such as those 
of the Green Revolution supported by Norman Borlaug) save land to prevent deforestation for 
instance [12-16]. Indeed, Green et al. have analyzed the extent to which agriculture should 
focus on intensively farmed land to conserve additional biodiversity-rich natural spaces 
elsewhere (land sparing) or on wildlife-friendly but less productive practices that conserve 
fewer wild natural spaces elsewhere (land sharing). 
To this end, Green et al. [11] have built a theoretical model that compares the overall 
biodiversity level obtained from a high-yield farming system versus a low-yield farming 
system when a given production target must be met, and they have assumed (as we do in this 
paper) that land quality is homogenous, biodiversity can be captured by a single indicator, and 
biodiversity per unit of land is a decreasing function of the agricultural yield (the higher the 
yield, the lower the biodiversity on the same unit of land). The original and noteworthy 
contribution of Green et al. is their discussion of the issues at stake according to the shape of 
this decreasing function. If the relationship between biodiversity and yield is a linear function, 
then the two farming system archetypes lead to the same loss of biodiversity. However, if the 
relationship is convex, then biodiversity decreases by a high amount on any natural land that 
is converted to agriculture and extensive farming leads to an overall greater loss of 
biodiversity than intensive farming, whereas if the relationship is concave, the opposite results 
are observed. According to Green et al., the available empirical data from a range of taxa in 
developing countries support a convex relationship and therefore the land sparing strategy. 
Phalan et al. [17] have reached a similar conclusion after comparing the densities of trees and 
birds for different agricultural intensities in Ghana and India.  
Green et al.’s [11] model and results have been subject to intense discussion and debate 
among scientists, notably ecologists (for a review, see Fischer et al. [18]). One dimension of 
this discussion, and the one our paper will investigate further, pertains to the fixed production 
target used for comparing the two farming system archetypes. In their introduction, Green et 
al. state that the world food demand is expected to more than double by 2050, and they 
wonder how this enormously increased demand can be met at the least cost to biodiversity. 
This method of posing the problem has been debated on two main grounds. First, food 
security is not necessarily ensured by a high level of food production. Currently, food 
insecurity and food malnutrition (including over-nutrition) are more closely related to 
distribution and regular access to quality and balanced food than production, especially 
because a significant part of the current production is used to feed animals and to produce 
biofuels or wasted [19-21]. Second, the intensification of agriculture could provide incentives 
for its expansion, which would then limit effective land sparing for conservation [22-24]. 
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Such a rebound effect, or Jevons paradox, may indeed occur if intensified agriculture allows 
productivity gains that lower prices and in turn encourage higher consumption and production 
levels [25]. In the face of such pressure, the effectiveness of land sparing is then contingent on 
the implementation of conservation zones (or protected areas), as emphasized by Green et al. 
[11], Ewers et al. [26], Phalan et al. [27], Balmford et al. [28] and Phalan et al. [29]. However, 
as noted by Fischer et al. [19], many countries lack the means to effectively protect such 
areas.  
A second dimension of the debate on land sparing and sharing (LSS) pertains to the 
assumptions of Green et al. on the relationship between yield and biodiversity, although this 
dimension is beyond the scope of our work. Four issues have been raised in the literature. 
First, agricultural yields are not independent from the level of biodiversity as assumed in the 
model. Biodiversity can indeed positively affect agricultural yields by providing better and 
more resilient local climate conditions, as well as higher services, such as pollination, 
biological control, and soil fertility [30-33]. Second, the relationship between biodiversity and 
yield may not necessarily be negative. This negative relationship is adequate in the case of 
industrial agriculture that specializes in few cultivated plants or domesticated animals whose 
production is controlled and increased through the use of external inputs (chemical fertilizers, 
genes, pesticides, antibiotics, etc.). However, as documented by Clough et al. [34], a positive 
relationship between biodiversity and yield characterizes the intensification path that relies on 
ecological functions and biological synergies between many plant and animal species, such as 
in agroecology [35] and ecological intensification [36, 37]. To encompass both intensification 
paths, it would then be necessary to model different biodiversity-yield relationships between 
conventional intensive agriculture and ecologically intensive agriculture, as suggested by 
Tscharntke et al. [21] (Figure 1, p. 54). Third, the conventional intensification path of 
agricultural production over the past half century has had negative effects on biodiversity and 
on water, soil and air quality [38]. These costs affect human health and security and are a 
considerable burden to high-yielding industrial agriculture. Fourth, Green et al. consider a 
single indicator of biodiversity and Phalan et al. [17] consider two indicators (the abundance 
of trees and birds), whereas a higher diversity of indicators is required, because many other 
plant and animal species (including belowground species) play a key role in the provision of 
ecosystem services, as does the genetic diversity within each species [18, 21].  
Although the literature provides an extensive discussion of all of the above issues, it 
rarely examines them through an analytical model. Similar to Green et al. [11], we believe 
that providing such an analytical framework is useful for clarifying the issues at stake. In this 
article, we propose an ecological and economical analytical model that addresses the first 
dimension of the discussion: the limitations induced by the assumption of an exogenous 
production target when comparing LSS strategies. To keep the model as simple and tractable 
as possible and to investigate the precise underlying mechanisms, our model uses the simple 
but debatable relationship between biodiversity and yield of the initial LSS framework 
(second dimension of the discussion). Additional realism and complexity may be added in a 
subsequent step.  
To provide a formal model capable of analyzing the limits of comparing LSS strategies 
for a given production target, we introduce price as an adjustment mechanism between 
agricultural supply and demand. With this price adjustment, if extensive farming has a higher 
cost per unit of production (and a fortiori per unit of land), then extensive farming can reach 
the production level of intensive farming only if farmers receive a higher price, which drives 
the demand downwards until a new market equilibrium is reached. Overall, we compare the 
level of biodiversity obtained with each farming system when prices, production and 
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consumption levels are the endogenous outcomes of market equilibrium. The effect on global 
welfare then depends on the relative weights attached to producer and consumer surpluses on 
one hand and to biodiversity conservation on the other.  
This article is related to other works that have introduced an economic dimension into 
the LSS framework. Hart et al. [39] theoretically investigate the less costly solution to reach a 
minimum target of wild nature and use numerical simulations on bird reproduction from 
mown grasslands in Sweden. Their model examines the first-best allocation of farm practices 
that minimizes the costs of reaching a minimum wildlife target and does not include prices or 
market incentives. These authors show that when wildlife production entails a fixed cost on 
each unit of land, the optimum is likely a split solution in which certain farms pursue high-
intensity production while others produce less for the sake of nature. In such production 
systems, policies that encourage the development of specialist environmental providers may 
perform better than the current environmental schemes of the European Common Agricultural 
Policy, for example. With an economic simulation model of market supply and demand, 
Hertel et al. [40] examine the extent to which a green revolution in Africa is likely to be land 
and emission sparing compared with a counterfactual world that does not include the 
innovations of prior green revolutions in Asia, Latin America and the Middle East. Our 
framework is simpler and less ambitious empirically, but it is related to their analysis of 
market adjustment caused by changes in agricultural productivity and has the additional intent 
of relating market effects explicitly to the original focus of the LSS framework, or 
biodiversity change. Martinet [41] uses a three-class land-use model (biological reserve, 
wildlife-friendly agriculture, and intensive agriculture) to show that LSS strategies are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive when agricultural productivity is heterogeneously spatially 
distributed. Indeed, it may be in the interest of farmers and collectively optimal to allocate 
land with high productivity to intensive farming, with intermediate productivity to extensive 
farming, and with low productivity to natural reserves. This optimal land allocation may be 
attained by a mix of policies that combine input use taxes to control intensity and natural 
reserve subsidies to promote conservation. This model introduces producers’ incentives but 
not price or welfare effects. Finally, the market and welfare framework developed by Meunier 
[42], which is closer to ours, explores a different range of questions by characterizing the 
optimal intensification level for a given marginal value of biodiversity, assessing the second-
best policies when the optimal policy cannot be implemented, and then showing that policy 
recommendations that are a priori optimal in a first-best setting may not be optimal in a 
second-best context.  
Compared with the above economic works, our research investigates in detail how the 
LSS strategy is affected when intensive and extensive farming practices are compared at 
market equilibrium rather than at a given production target. We first present our theoretical 
framework along with its assumptions (section 2), and we then run our model to show the 
rebound effect of agricultural intensification in three different ways. The intuition of this 
rebound effect is shown by a graphic analysis. An analytical resolution of our model is then 
performed to formally demonstrate the set of situations under which the consideration of 
market effects reverts the initial LSS result. Numerical simulations are then performed to 
illustrate that our results are relevant even in a context where the price elasticity of demand 
for agricultural products is low, as suggested by the available empirical evidence (section 3). 
We then extend the model to further investigate two important questions raised by the initial 
LSS framework (section 4). First, we explore the extent to which “active” land sparing that 
consists of land-use zoning to counteract the rebound effect of agricultural intensification 
creates incentives for farmers to encroach on conservation zones. Second, we indirectly 
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introduce certain elements of the LSS debate related to food security by distinguishing three 
goods: plant-based food products, feed used for animal-based food and biofuel products.  
Our results show that even with a convex relationship between biodiversity and yield, 
biodiversity may be higher with extensive farming rather than intensive farming. The lower 
profitability of extensive farming leads to higher market prices and, therefore, to lower 
demand and production than with intensive farming. Consequently, agricultural land use 
increases to a lower extent than with a constant level of production and could even decrease in 
certain situations. Extensive farming is therefore favorable to biodiversity in many more cases 
than in the initial LSS framework. However, consumer surplus necessarily decreases, as does 
the sum of consumer and producer surplus, while producer surplus may either increase or 
decrease. Extensive farming could also decrease the agricultural pressure on conservation 
zones by reducing farmer incentives to encroach on these areas. The feed and animal products 
market, which has higher price elasticity, could be reduced and biofuel production could be 
almost unchanged with current mandatory blending policies. The differences between 
extensive and intensive farming do not show straightforward effects on food security because 
increased food prices provide better revenues for poor farmers and better ecosystem services 
for agriculture and society. 
 
2 Theoretical framework 
 
Similar to Green et al. [11], we compare a high yield scenario (land-sparing 
conventional intensive farming) with a lower yield scenario (wildlife-friendly extensive 
farming). As such, this stylized representation can account for two contrasting agricultural 
systems: (i) agro-industrial systems based on large farms that are highly mechanized with 
powerful motorized machinery and specialized in a few monocultures (or a single animal 
species) and present a high use of chemical inputs (fertilizers, pesticides, antibiotics, etc.); and 
(ii) extensive farming systems based on small farms with mixed crop and livestock production 
that limit the use of chemical inputs by valuing biological interactions between species but 
require more time and labor (for crop rotation and care, breeding, harvesting, etc.). Extensive 
farming systems, such as organic farming systems, offer more favorable conditions for local 
biodiversity, although they attain lower yields than intensive farming [33, 43, 44].  
For these two contrasting and exclusive scenarios, we introduce market equilibrium 
using a simple method in which we assume a price-increasing supply function and a price-
decreasing demand function for agricultural products at the global level. We also assume that 
the value of agricultural products is the same for consumers whether farming is intensive or 
extensive. However, their production costs differ. The differences between the two scenarios 




2.1 Relationship between biodiversity and yield 
 
Similar to Green et al., we assume that any land cultivated using a given farming system 
has the same yield, with yi = 1 for intensive farming and ye < 1 for extensive farming. The 
biodiversity conservation per unit of land is represented by a decreasing function of yield:  
(1) f(y) = 1 - yα,  
which may be linear (α = 1), convex (α < 1), or concave (α > 1) (see Figure 1).  
This equation normalizes the biodiversity per unit of intensively farmed land to 0 (f(1) = 
0) and per unit of uncultivated wildlife spaces to 1 (f(0) = 1).1  
[Insert Figure 1] 
Equation (1) has the advantage of simplicity, although it entails three limitations that 
were discussed in our introduction: (i) the agricultural yield is independent of the biodiversity 
level, (ii) the trade-off between biodiversity and yield is independent of the intensification 
path, and (iii) the biodiversity can be characterized by a single indicator.  
 
2.2 Agricultural production, land use, and producer surplus 
 
Production is represented by an inverse supply function that defines price as a function 
of the quantity supplied by the farm sector, p = sk(q). We assume that this function is linear 
and defined by sk(q) = ak q – b when farmers use farming system k, with ak > 0 (k = i or e) (a 
higher price is needed for producers to supply a higher quantity).2 We assume that the price 
elasticity of supply (the percentage change in production resulting from a 1% price change) is 
less than 1, which is consistent with the elasticities from empirical studies for the majority of 
agricultural products [45]. This price elasticity implies that b > 0.3 The inverse supply 
function is defined on an interval where the marginal costs of production are positive, i.e., q > 
b / ak (see Figure 2) and production is consistent with the physical limits on land availability, 
i.e., q < L yk. Therefore, the following function is derived: 
(2)  q  [b / ak, L yk], sk(q) = ak q – b.  
 [Insert Figure 2] 
For each farming system, land use is equal to production divided by yield as long as a 
portion of land remains available: 
(3)  q  [b / ak, L yk], lk(q) = q / yk. 
                                                            
1 Assuming a positive level of biodiversity on intensively farmed land, such as in Green et al. [11], does not 
change the results of the model. 
2  This function indicates that the marginal cost of producing the quantity q of the agricultural good with 
technology k is equal to sk(q). Our model is consistent with the assumption that production is conducted by a 
continuum of perfectly competitive farmers with different agricultural production costs. Then, the marginal 
farmer who enters this production system, which is characterized by the highest cost of production, has a cost 
equal to sk(q). The production level q is obtained when the market price p is equal to sk(q); therefore, all 
producers receive a positive surplus from their production except the marginal farmer, who produces with a zero 
surplus. 
3 The price elasticity of supply is sk = (p / q) q / p = (p / q) / (sk(q) / q) = (ak q - b) / (ak q); the value is lower 
than 1 if and only if b > 0.  
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Agricultural producer surplus is the difference between the price received by producers 
and their cost of production and determined by the area between the price and the inverse 
supply curve (see Figure 2a): 
(4)  q  [b / ak, L yk], SUpk(q) = (ak2 q2 – b2) / (2 ak).  
Finally, we assume that at a given market price, profitability for producers is higher 
with intensive than with extensive farming. This assumption is consistent with empirical 
results indicating that organic farming remains a niche market, currently representing 1% of 
the world agricultural area [46], and would seldom be competitive with conventional intensive 
farming without price premiums for organic products (see the meta-analysis in [47], as well as 
[48], [49] and [50]). It is also consistent with empirical evidence indicating that subsidies and 
other public policies, as well as public or private research and extension services, favor 
conventional intensive farming ([48], [51], [52], [53]) which financial, social, health and 
environmental burdens are only partially addressed ([53], [54], [55]). In our model, this 
translates into the assumption that production costs are higher with extensive farming than 
with intensive farming: 
(5) ae > ai.  
Graphically, this inequality implies that the inverse supply curve is higher in the 
extensive farming scenario than in the intensive farming scenario; therefore, identical 
production levels may be obtained in the intensive and extensive farming scenarios only if the 
agricultural price is higher in the extensive scenario. 
 
2.3 Level of biodiversity according to the farming system 
 
If land lk is allocated to a crop of type k, then the total quantity of biodiversity is given 
by lk f(yk) + (L - lk) f(0); however, because f(y) = 1 - y
, it is written as follows:  
(6) Bk(lk) = L  lk ykα.  
For intensive farming, yi = 1; therefore, Bi(li) = L – li. For extensive farming, 
biodiversity depends on the shape of the relationship between biodiversity and yield as shown 
in Table 1, where all possible cases are described, including the limit case Be(le), where there 
is no biodiversity in land farmed extensively (α = 0), the linear case Be
l(le), and the limit case 
B̅e, where farming land extensively does not affect biodiversity (α  +). 
 
 Table 1. Biodiversity according to the farming system 
Farming System Biodiversity-Yield 
relationship: f(y) = 1 – y 
Biodiversity 
Bk(lk) 
Intensive (yi = 1) f(y) = 0  Bi(li) = L – li 
Extensive (ye < 1) Convex  = 0 Be(le) = L – le 
    (0, 1) Be(le)  (L – le, L – le ye)    
 Linear  = 1 Bel(le) = L – le ye 
    (1, +) Be(le)  (L – le ye, L) 





2.4 Consumer demand and surplus, market equilibrium and welfare 
 
We assume that in both possible states of the world, the value of the agricultural product 
is the same for consumers and does not integrate biodiversity, which is a public good. Inverse 
demand is modeled classically as a linear decreasing function of quantity: 
(7) d(q) = c – g q. 
Consumer surplus is the difference between the willingness of consumers to pay (that is, 
the amount of the agricultural good consumers are willing to purchase at a given price) and 
the price they pay (see Figure 2b): 
(8) Suc(q) = g q2 / 2.  
Equilibrium is studied according to the farming system (intensive or extensive) and 
characterized as follows: 
(9) sk(q) = d(q).  
Total welfare is the sum of producer surplus, consumer surplus, and the social utility of 
the conservation of biodiversity, denoted by an increasing function U: 
(10) Wk(q) = SU
p
k(q) + Su
c(q) + U(Bk(lk(q))).  
Throughout the remainder of this article, we use the term “total surplus” to indicate the 
sum of producer and consumer surplus (this total surplus is different from total welfare 
because it does not include biodiversity). 
Because of our restrictive assumption that production costs and yields are not dependent 
on the state of biodiversity, the utility derived from biodiversity is independent of the 
producer surplus in this welfare function. The only environmental impact of agriculture 
considered in this welfare function is on biodiversity. Additional environmental and health 
effects caused by the use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides are not considered and may 
underestimate the negative impacts of intensive farming, which relies more heavily on these 
inputs. 
 
3 Rebound effect of agricultural intensification 
 
3.1 Graphic analysis of the rebound effect 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the case of a perfectly inelastic demand (quantity demanded does not 
respond to prices). Figure 4 illustrates the case of a perfectly elastic demand (there exists a 
price level for which or below which demand is infinite, while there is no demand for the 
good at a higher price). Each figure shows the (a) market equilibrium and (b) land use 
according to the farming choice and the (c) biodiversity conservation according to the farming 
choice and the yield-biodiversity trade-off. 
With a perfectly inelastic demand, and therefore a constant quantity as in Green et al., 
market equilibrium occurs at price pi
* with intensive farming and at the higher price pe
* with 
extensive farming (Figure 3a). To achieve the production level qi
* = qe
*, additional land must 
be farmed extensively (le
*) than intensively (li
*) (Figure 3b). Based on these equilibrium land-
use levels, the outcome in terms of biodiversity depends on the trade-off between biodiversity 
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and yield. If the relationship between biodiversity and yield is linear, then extensive farming 
produces the same level of biodiversity as intensive farming (Be
l* = Bi
*) (Figure 3c); if this 
relationship is convex (between Be
* and Be
l*, depending on the degree of convexity), then 
extensive farming produces less biodiversity; and if it is concave (between Be
l* and B̅e, 
depending on the degree of concavity), then it produces more biodiversity. These results are 
identical to those of Green et al. [11] because our framework is similar to theirs when 
equilibrium consumption is the same for both agricultural systems regardless of their 
respective profitability. 
[Insert Figure 3] 
If the demand is perfectly elastic, then the price level is the same with extensive and 
intensive farming. The extensive farming equilibrium is characterized by lower production 
levels (Figure 4a) and higher land use (Figure 4b). Biodiversity is lower with extensive 
farming if the relationship between biodiversity and yield presents a “high” degree of 
convexity (between Be
* and B), and it is higher if it presents a “low” degree of convexity or it 
is linear or concave (between B and B̅e).  
 [Insert Figure 4]  
The results of Green et al. [11] no longer hold if we assume that production results from 
the market equilibrium. As long as demand is elastic, equilibrium production is higher with 
intensive farming than with extensive farming. With this rebound effect of intensive farming, 
the total biodiversity may be higher with extensive farming even when the relationship 
between biodiversity and yield is convex. 
We complete the analysis by considering the welfare differences between the two 
farming scenarios. If the demand is perfectly inelastic (Figure 3), then extensive farming 
provides a greater benefit to producers than intensive farming, although it is detrimental to 
consumers and the total surplus. These changes in surplus correspond to the established 
results in the literature in which a productivity loss is detrimental to the consumer surplus and 
total surplus, but may increase the producer surplus if it is accompanied by a price increase 
because of an inelastic demand [45]. If the demand is perfectly elastic (Figure 4), then the 
producers have a lower surplus with extensive farming (rather than intensive) and both 
farming systems yield a zero consumer surplus. In both cases, when extensive farming yields 
a higher biodiversity level, its social utility alleviates or even cancels out the loss of producer 
and consumer surpluses, whereas in the opposite case, the lower biodiversity associated with 
extensive farming worsens the negative welfare impact of extensive farming. 
 
3.2 Analytical effect of farming systems on biodiversity 
 
The previous graphic results have been obtained for perfectly elastic or perfectly 
inelastic demand. We now extend the results analytically to a case in which demand is 
imperfectly elastic (the slope of the inverse of the linear demand curve c is positive and 
finite). Based on the definition of supply and demand in equations (1) and (7), the equilibrium 
equation (9) yields the equilibrium quantity qk
*. The equilibrium price pk
* is then defined 
equivalently by sk(qk
*) or d(qk
*). The equilibrium farmed land, producer surplus, consumer 
surplus, and biodiversity level are obtained from equations (3), (4), (8), and (6), respectively. 
The equilibrium values are given in Table 2, and Proposition 1 is inferred from these values. 
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Table 2. Equilibrium values of the model variables 
Price pk
* = (ak c – b g) / (ak + g) 
Agricultural production qk
* = (b + c) / (ak + g) 
Farmed land lk
* = (b + c) / ((ak + g)yk) 
Producer surplus  SUpk
* = ak(b + c)
2 / (2(ak + g)
2) – b2 / (2ak) 
Consumer surplus  SUck
* = g (b + c)2 / (2(ak + g)
2) 
Biodiversity Bk
* = 1 – (b + c)yk
α - 1 / (ak + g)  
Note: ai and ae are the slopes of the intensive and extensive inverse supply curves, 
respectively, with ae > ai; b is the opposite of the intercept of the linear supply curve; c and 
g are the intercept and the slope of the inverse demand curve, respectively; yi = 1 is the yield 
of intensive farming; ye < 1 is the yield of extensive farming; and α is the parameter that 
characterizes the degree of concavity or convexity of the relationship between biodiversity 
and yield. All of these parameters are positive. A necessary and sufficient condition for 
equilibrium is a positive equilibrium price, ak c > b g. 
 
Proposition 1. Comparison of equilibrium and welfare under extensive and intensive farming. 
If the land availability is not exhausted, then the following holds under extensive farming: 
- the price level is higher and the levels of production, consumer surplus, and total (consumer 
and producer) surplus  are smaller; 
- land use, biodiversity, and producer surplus may be higher or lower:  
- Land use is higher if and only if g + ai > (g + ae) ye;  
- The biodiversity levels is higher if and only if g + ae > (g + ai) ye
α – 1 (or equivalently, 
α > ᾶ, with ᾶ = 1  ln((ae + g) / (ai +g)) / ln (1 / ye)); 
- Producer surplus is higher if and only if (b + c)2 [ai / (ai + g)
2 – ae / (ae + g)
2] > b2(ae 
– ai) / (ae ai). 
 
This proposition extends the graphic evidence provided above on the conditions under 
which the basic result of the initial LSS framework holds. Proposition 1 shows that as long as 
extensive farming is more costly than intensive farming and as long as demand reacts to 
prices, then the price will be higher and the agricultural production (and consumption) will be 
lower than that under intensive farming. This market reaction reduces the negative impact of 
extensive farming on land use and biodiversity loss, and it extends the range of situations in 
which extensive farming performs better than intensive farming in terms of biodiversity 
conservation. 
Based on this proposition, extensive farming may use less land than intensive farming 
under certain parameter values, which would result in a higher biodiversity level regardless of 
the shape of the relationship between biodiversity and yield.4 The most expected scenario, 
however, is that farmed land will be higher with extensive farming, and according to the 
                                                            
4 Because ye  (0, 1) and α > 0, we have yeα < 1. Land use decreases when (g + ae) ye > g + ai, which implies (g 
+ ae) ye > (g + ai) ye
α, the condition under which biodiversity increases. 
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above proposition, occurs under the following conditions: demand does not respond 
excessively to price (g is high enough), the yield of extensive farming (ye) is sufficiently small 
compared with the yield of intensive farming (yi = 1), and/or the unit production costs are not 
excessively higher under extensive farming than with intensive farming (ae not much higher 
than ai).  
When farmed land is higher under extensive farming, the biodiversity level is also 
higher when the relationship between biodiversity and yield is linear or concave (α ≥ 1).5 
When this relationship is convex (α < 1), the outcome in terms of biodiversity depends on the 
relative values of parameter α, the yield of extensive farming (ye), the inverse demand slope 
(g), and the extensive and intensive inverse supply slopes (ai and ae). It is more likely that 
biodiversity will be higher under extensive farming if the demand quantity responds to prices 
(low g), the extensive supply responds less to price compared with the intensive supply (ae 
sufficiently higher than ai), and the relationship between biodiversity and yield has a low 
degree of convexity (α close to 1).6  
In all cases, extensive farming is detrimental for consumers, who reduce their purchases 
because of higher prices, and it has a negative impact on the aggregate producer and 
consumer surplus because of the higher production costs under extensive farming. However, 
as is usually the case with this type of model, there is no intuitive interpretation of the cases in 
which the producer surplus is higher or lower.7  
 
3.3 Numerical illustration with a low elasticity of demand  
 
The rebound effect (higher market size in the equilibrium with intensive farming) 
hinges on the condition that the demand for agricultural goods increases when the prices 
decrease. However, available empirical evidence suggests that the price elasticities of demand 
for agricultural goods are low, at least in the short run (see, e.g., USDA ERS [56] and FAPRI 
[57]). To assess the extent to which the integration of market equilibrium empirically affects 
the result of the initial LSS framework within a context of low change in demand with regards 
to price, we have run numerical simulations with plausible values of supply and demand 
elasticities. In these simulations, we consider an unfavorable biodiversity case under extensive 
farming by assuming a low elasticity of demand, a convex relation between biodiversity and 
yield and a higher land use value. 
We rely on the estimates of agricultural supply and demand elasticities provided by 
Roberts and Schlenker [58], who have aggregated four major crops (corn, wheat, rice and 
soybean) that together account for three quarters of the caloric content of the global food 
production. Our simulations are run with the lowest and highest estimations of their demand 
and supply elasticities. Thus, with intensive farming, the supply elasticity is si  {0.09, 0.14} 
and the demand elasticity is d  {0.07, 0.03}. We consider the case where extensive 
                                                            
5 Because ae > ai and ye < 1, we have ln((ae + g) / (ai + g)) / ln (1 / ye)) > 0, and therefore, ᾶ < 1. 
6 In the case where the relation between biodiversity and yield is convex, because ye  (0, 1) and α  [0, 1), we 
have ye
α-1 > 1, with ye
α-1  1 when α 1 and yeα-1 = 1 / ye when α = 0. 
7 Analogous to Karagiannis and Furtan [44], who consider an infinitesimal variation in the slope of the supply 
curve, it is possible to interpret only a necessary condition for an increase in producer surplus. This necessary 
condition is that the section between square brackets of the left-hand term in the inequality presented in 
Proposition 1 must be positive, which is the case if and only if ai ae > g
2 (the product of the two slopes of the 
inverse supply is higher than the square of the inverse demand slope). 
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farming is characterized by a 10% lower yield than intensive farming. We numerically 
assume that the relationship between biodiversity and yield is convex (α < 1), in which case 
biodiversity conservation on extensively farmed land must be less than 10% of the 
biodiversity of unfarmed land (0 ≤ f(ye) < 10%). In the simulations, these values vary between 
1% and 9% and different values are assigned to the extensive supply slope, which is 
consistent with the assumption that land use is higher with extensive farming (see note to 
Figure 5). 
In these simulations, biodiversity is lower with extensive farming rather than with 
intensive farming by 1% on average, and the standard deviation is 6% (Figure 5a). Thus, even 
in the unfavorable case considered here, the level of biodiversity is higher with extensive 
farming for an important set of parameter values. When we additionally assume that the 
degree of convexity of the biodiversity-yield relationship is very high, with extensively 
farmed land conserving only 2% of the biodiversity that would prevail on uncultivated land ( 
≈ 0.19), then extensive farming leads to a 7% lower biodiversity on average than intensive 
farming (with a standard deviation of 3%) (Figure 5b). If the biodiversity-yield relationship 
convexity is lowered so that the biodiversity per land unit is four-fold higher, or 8% of the 
biodiversity level of uncultivated land (f(ye) = 0.08,  ≈ 0.79), then extensive farming 
practices increase biodiversity by 5% on average (with a standard deviation of 3%) (Figure 
5c). These simulations illustrate that the LSS results may be reverted when market effects are 
considered, even under scenarios with a low elasticity of demand for agricultural products. 
[Insert Figure 5] 
 
 
4 Rebound effect with land-use zoning and food-feed-biofuel production 
 
We now consider two extensions of our model to integrate two dimensions of the 
debates surrounding the assumption of an exogenous production target in the initial LSS 
framework. One extension pertains to the effect of zoning certain lands for conservation on 
our results, whereas the other pertains to the possibility of producing different goods from the 
plant product that do not all contribute equally to food security. These extensions enable us to 
clarify the effect of agricultural extensification in the two examined cases. 
 
4.1 Agricultural pressure on land zoned for conservation according to the farming systems 
 
We have considered that agricultural land use is determined by the equilibrium of the 
agricultural market. We now consider the hypothetical effect of implementing an “active” 
land sparing mechanism to overcome the rebound effect of “passive” land sparing [29]. We 
consider that a portion of land is zoned for agriculture and another for conservation to 
conserve a minimum level of biodiversity Bc.  
The effect of land-use zoning is represented in Figure 6. For clarity, we have 
concentrated on the case of a linear relationship between biodiversity and yield and plotted 
the equilibria with intensive and extensive farming separately. Since there is greater 
biodiversity on land farmed extensively than intensively, the conservation of a minimum 
biodiversity level imposes a larger zone for agriculture and a smaller zone for conservation 
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when farming is extensive rather than intensive. With exogenous yield levels, zoning land for 
agriculture is then equivalent to introducing a production quota qc, which is identical for both 
production systems under the assumption of a linear relationship between biodiversity and 
yield adopted in the figure.  
[Insert Figure 6] 
Because land-use zoning limits agricultural expansion, incentives to encroach on land 
zoned for conservation occur. In equilibrium, the agricultural price under both farming 
systems is higher than the marginal cost of production, and farmers who find it profitable to 
encroach conservation zones are those with a cost of production ranging from mcic (the 
marginal cost of production in equilibrium) to pic (the equilibrium market price) in the case of 
intensive farming, and a marginal cost of production ranging from mcec to pec in the case of 
extensive farming. As shown on Figure 6, the incentive to encroach on land zoned for 
conservation is higher for intensive farming than for extensive farming. 
This graphic analysis can be generalized by analytically determining the wedge between 
the market price and the marginal production cost resulting from the implementation of the 
conservation zone under each production system. From our equilibrium model, this price-cost 
wedge is calculated as follows: 
(11) pkc  mckc = b + c – (ak + g) (1  Bc) yk1, k  {i, e},8 
where pkc and mckc are the price and the marginal cost of production when the equilibrium is 
constrained by the protection of a minimum biodiversity level Bc, respectively. 
When biodiversity protection constrains agricultural expansion, the encroachment of 
agriculture on land zoned for conservation is profitable. The incentive to encroach on 
conservation zones is higher with intensive rather than extensive farming under the condition 
pic  mcic > pec  mcec, which is equivalent to (ae + g) ye1 > ai + g as summarized in 
Proposition 2. 
 
Proposition 2. Incentives to encroach on land zoned for conservation. 
Zoning land for agriculture and conservation to ensure a minimum level of biodiversity 
introduces a wedge between the equilibrium price and the marginal production costs within 
the agricultural market. This wedge creates an incentive for potential producers whose 
marginal production costs are smaller than the equilibrium price to encroach on land zoned 
for conservation. The price to marginal cost wedge and the incentive to encroach are higher 
with intensive than extensive farming if and only if (ae + g) ye
1 > ai + g. Because ae > ai 
(equation 5), this condition holds as long as the relationship between biodiversity and yield is 
linear, concave (α ≥ 1) or has a sufficiently low degree of convexity (α < 1). 
 
This proposition notes the difficulties of land-use zoning to implement “active” land 
sparing because farmers have an incentive to encroach on land zoned for conservation (see 
                                                            
8 A minimum level of biodiversity Bc introduces a cap on land use lkc with farming system k  {i, e}. From 
equation (6), this cap is defined by lkc = (1  Bc) yk; from equation (3), it results in a production cap 
qkc = (1  Bc) yk1. The price equilibrium is at the intersection of the production cap and the inverse demand 
curve (7), pkc = c  g qkc, whereas the marginal cost of production is at the intersection of the production cap and 
the inverse supply curve (2), mckc = ak qkc  b. Therefore, the price-cost difference is pkc  mckc = b + c – (ak + g) 
qkc; based on the expression of qkc, this difference yields equation (11). 
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also Phelps et al. [59]). The incentive to encroach is higher when farming is intensive rather 
than extensive for many of the parameter values in our model.  
 
4.2 Food, feed and biofuel goods 
 
Although our model should not be used to address food security issues beyond food 
production, it may provide insights into such issues by incorporating an extension with 
different possible goods produced from the same plant product. This multi-good model can be 
used to analyze the effect of intensive or extensive production systems on market equilibria 
and determine the extent to which these systems may actually favor specific uses that have the 
potential to impact food security.   
A unique plant product is considered here, and we distinguish three possible goods 
produced from this plant product: plant-based food, denoted by F; animal feed for the 
production of meat, milk, and eggs (or simply “feed”), denoted by f; and biofuels, denoted by 
b. For simplification, we assume that demands for these three products are independent. They 
are modeled as follows: 
(12) dk(q) = ck – gk q, k = F, f or b. 
The total inverse demand function is then as follows: 
(13) c = (k ck / gk) / (k 1 / gk); g = 1 / (k 1 / gk), k = F, f or b.9  
The former framework applies, with demand parameters c and g now defined by (12) as 
functions of the parameters of the three inverse demand functions. 
The literature usually does not distinguish among the price elasticities of plant-based 
food, feed, or biofuel uses of plant products, because many plant products, such as cereals and 
oilseeds, are suitable for all three uses, which increases the difficulty of estimating their 
individual elasticities. We assume that the feed demand (demand for plant products used for 
animal feed) is more price elastic than the plant-based food demand. Indeed, the demand 
elasticities for animal-based products, such as milk or meat, are higher than the demand 
elasticities for cereal foodstuffs, such as rice or bread [56]. Conversely, we assume that 
biofuel is price inelastic because of current policies (such as in the United States, Europe, and 
Brazil) in which biofuels must be blended into fossil fuel [60]. Given such policies, an 
increase in the agricultural price contributes to increase slightly fuel prices and therefore 
decrease slightly the demand for fuels, causing a small decrease in the quantity of the plant 
product used for biofuel production [61]. Therefore, the inverse demand for biofuels has a 
higher slope than the inverse demand for food, which has a higher slope than the demand for 
feed: 
(14) gb > gF > gf. 
As previously analyzed, the equilibrium price is higher with extensive than intensive 
farming. Based on Assumption (13), this price increase primarily leads to a decrease in the 
production of feed, which has a more elastic demand, and has less of an effect on plant-based 
food. In addition, biofuel demand is quasi-identical under both farming systems as illustrated 
in Figure 7. 
                                                            
9 For each product, the demand function is Dk(p) = ck / gk – p / gk. Therefore, the total demand is D(p) = (k ck / 
gk) – (k 1 / gk) p, from which we deduce the expression of the total inverse demand in (12). 
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Insert Figure 7 
This analysis allows us to discuss the argument developed by Angelsen [62] that 
“higher yield can reduce the food share, as food demand is typically more price inelastic than 
demand for nonfood commodities.” Our analysis shows that as long as our assumptions on 
price elasticities for the different agricultural goods are plausible, Angelsen's result holds in 
our context in terms of feed versus plant-based food consumption but not in terms of biofuel 
versus total food consumption. In our model, extensive farming may alleviate pressures on 
biodiversity by increasing the agricultural price, which is primarily a detriment to feed 
production and has less of an effect on plant-based food production, and even less on biofuel 
production.  
It should be emphasized that mandatory blending policies reduces the effect of changes 
in farming systems on biofuel production. The scientific debate on the environmental effects 
of biofuels remains largely centered on greenhouse gas emissions, which may decrease or 
increase depending on indirect changes in land use. However, the effect of biofuels on 
biodiversity, which is less frequently studied, is indubitably negative (see Krausmann et al. 
[63]), and based on the current policies mandating their increased use, neither an intensive nor 
an extensive farming system can be expected to significantly mitigate this negative impact. 
In our model, feed production is significantly smaller under extensive rather than 
intensive farming, and this difference could have a positive impact on biodiversity by 
reducing the higher pressure exerted by the demand for animal-based food products (and, 
thus, for feed to produce them) than that exerted by the demand for plant-based food products. 
Indeed, approximately three calories (or proteins) of plant products that could directly feed 
humans (e.g., cereals or oilseeds) are currently used to feed animals to produce one calorie (or 
protein) of edible animal products (meat, milk, and eggs) [20]10. Moreover, this 3:1 ratio tends 
to increase over time because increases in the demand for animal-based food products 
increase the incentives to convert grazing pastures or forests into feed crops, which are often 
monocultures of cereals and oilseeds with a higher production of feed per unit of land.  
A reduction in animal feed production would be detrimental in terms of consumer 
surplus, although it may not have as great of an effect on food security because human beings 
don’t need to eat animal-based food in large quantity [64]. In this respect, it should be noted 
that the per capita consumption of animal-based food is by far the highest among wealthy 
countries, as well as the conversion of plant food products into animal feed products.11 A 
preference for extensive farming would therefore have a stronger impact on consumers in 
wealthy countries through increases in the price of animal-based food, which they tend to 
overconsume to the detriment of their health (cardiovascular and other diseases). Therefore, 
public policies encouraging extensive farming could complement other policies aimed at 
influencing consumption patterns to decrease the overconsumption of animal-based food [20].  
The higher prices under extensive farming could be detrimental to food security by 
reducing food production and would impact consumers in poor countries, especially poor 
urban consumers who rely on imports, which occurred during the 2007-2008 international 
food price hike. However, three factors that lie beyond the scope of our model may balance 
                                                            
10 This ratio is a world average and excludes biomass that is not edible for humans but edible for animals, such 
as pastures, fodder crops, and crop residues. 
11 In poor countries, there is a significantly higher use of non-food biomass for feed (such as bush or crop / food 
residues) because arable land is mainly cultivated for food. Milk and meat yields are lower per animal, although 




this effect. First, this increase in agricultural prices could benefit the hundreds of millions of 
small agricultural producers concentrated in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, who are among 
the poorest consumers in the world and account for the main share of farmers [65]. Second, 
the additional biodiversity resulting from a scenario with extensive farming could have 
beneficial effects on the provision of ecosystem services associated with the health and 
welfare of consumers, notably the poorest consumers [66], with these services including 
biological plant, animal, and human disease control (instead of pesticides or antibiotics), 
water purification, and nutrient recycling. Third, additional biodiversity resulting from a 
scenario with extensive farming may have positive effects in the medium and long run on 
yields and their resilience by improving soil fertility, local climate conditions, and/or 




The effect on biodiversity of conventional agricultural intensification has been highly 
disputed in the academic literature, especially in the field of ecology, since the publication in 
2005 of Green et al.’s LSS article in favour of the “land sparing” option where biodiversity 
and agriculture production are segregated spatially in order to maximize both. Here, we 
propose an analytical framework that compares an “intensive” agriculture (no biodiversity) 
and an “extensive” agriculture (more biodiversity-friendly) at market equilibrium and not at a 
specific production target level as in the initial LSS model. We show that the integration of 
market effects extends the set of scenarios in which extensive farming is more favorable to 
biodiversity than intensive farming. As long as demand is responsive to prices and extensive 
farming is more costly than intensive farming, there is indeed a rebound effect of farming 
intensification. i.e. a higher equilibrium production. This rebound effect limits the extent to 
which intensive farming can conserve land from agricultural use. As a result, intensive 
farming may be more detrimental to biodiversity than extensive farming, even when 
biodiversity is more affected by the conversion of land to agriculture than by the degree of 
agricultural intensification. In other words, compared with the case in the initial LSS 
framework, intensive farming may not perform better than extensive farming in terms of 
biodiversity conservation even if the relationship between biodiversity and yield is convex. 
The outcome of farming on biodiversity is actually better with an intensive rather than 
extensive production system only if the degree of this convexity is very high. Using numerical 
simulations, we illustrate that this result holds true even when the price elasticity of 
agricultural demand is low, which is supported by the available empirical evidence. We also 
note that consumer surplus and the aggregate of consumer and producer surpluses are lower 
with extensive farming; however, the effect on producer surplus is indeterminate. Therefore, 
when extensive farming is optimal for biodiversity, a trade-off occurs between biodiversity 
conservation and consumer and producer surpluses.  
We also discuss the extent to which conservation zones affect the rebound effect of 
intensive farming. In our model, conservation zones have a similar effect as a production 
quota. Therefore, they introduce a difference between the agricultural consumer price and the 
marginal production cost. As a result, farmers have an incentive to encroach on these 
conservation zones. Because of the rebound effect of market intensification, this incentive to 
encroach is higher when farming is intensive rather than extensive for a large set of situations; 
thus, farming intensification increases the difficulty of implementing “active” land sparing 
through land-use zoning. Finally, we argue that the smaller production levels in the scenario 
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with extensive rather than intensive farming would primarily affect feed production. We also 
argue that the loss of food security caused by an increase in food prices would be mitigated by 
several effects that are not integrated in our modeling framework, including improved living 
conditions for poor farmers, the provision of enhanced ecosystem services, and the positive 
long-run effect of biodiversity on yields and their resilience to shocks. We also note that 
biofuel production is not expected to be significantly affected by changes in production 
systems as long as public policies mandate biofuel blending into fossil fuels.  
This research provides a formal comparison of how intensive and extensive production 
systems affect biodiversity at market equilibrium rather than at a target production level. 
However, our model does not address the other dimension of the debates and discussions 
pertaining to the initial LSS framework and its oversimplified assumptions regarding the 
relationship between biodiversity and yield. Our model may overestimate the set of scenarios 
in which intensive farming produces a better outcome than extensive farming by ignoring the 
negative impacts caused by intensive farming other than the loss of biodiversity. In addition, 
our model ignores the positive and dynamic effects of yield gains that occur through enhanced 
biodiversity, especially under an agroecological intensification path. The analysis of such 
effects in a dynamic bio-economic framework will be the subject of future research. 
Our analysis could also be extended to distinguish among different countries according 
to their level of development and contribution to the international trade of agricultural 
commodities. Such an analysis would enable us to determine in greater detail the effects of 
contrasted farming systems on different agricultural productions and on the three components 
of welfare (producer surplus, consumer surplus, and biodiversity) for each type of country. It 
would also be interesting to consider surpluses along the agro-food chains. This could be 
accomplished by distinguishing between farmers, for which welfare effects are indeterminate 
in our model, and industrial input suppliers (chemical fertilizers, pesticides and fossil energy), 
which would have smaller surpluses with extensive farming. 
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Legend: Biodiversity per unit of land is a decreasing function of yield, which may be linear 
(plain line, fl(ye) = 1 – y), convex (dashed curve a, here in the case of fx(y) = 1-y
1/2), or 
concave (dashed curve b, here in the case of fc(y) = 1-y
2). The figure shows the biodiversity 




Figure 2. Producer and consumer surpluses 
 
Legend: (a) Producer surplus is drawn in a quantity / price or marginal cost space. The inverse 
supply curve Sk intersects the p-axis at b / ak and, therefore, represents the marginal cost of 
production for q  b / ak. As a classical consequence of the linear approximation, given b > 0, 
our model assumes that any quantity between 0 and b / ak is produced at no cost, whereas 
quantities above b / ak are produced at a positive and increasing marginal cost. Based on the 
inverse supply function Sk, a quantity q is produced at a price ak q – b. Producer surplus is 
determined by the sum of the areas of rectangle ABED, which is equal to (ak q –b) b / ak, and 
of triangle BCE, which is equal to (ak q – b)(q - b / ak) / 2.  
(b) Consumer surplus is drawn in a quantity / price space. Based on the inverse demand 
function D, which represents the consumers’ willingness to pay, a quantity q is consumed at a 
price c – g q. Consumer surplus is determined by the triangle FGH, which measures the area 
between the consumers’ willingness to pay and the equilibrium price. 
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Legend: (a) Market equilibrium in quantity (q) / price (p) space. The demand function D is 
perfectly inelastic (demand does not react to prices, which occurs under the conditions c  
+ and g  +). Other parameter values are ai = 1.5, ae = 2, ye = 0.7, L = 1 and c / g = 2/3. 
The figure depicts the quantity supplied and demanded at any given price and the equilibrium 
prices and quantities at the intersection of supply and demand functions for intensive and 
extensive farming. Under an intensive farming system (supply function Si) in equilibrium, 
quantity is qi
*, price is pi
*, and producer surplus is 0pi
*BA. Under an extensive farming system 
(supply function Se) in equilibrium, quantity is qe
* = qi
*, price is pe
*, and producer surplus is 
0pe
*CF. Compared with intensive farming, global producer surpluses under extensive farming 
decrease by the area EFAB but increase by the area pe
*pi
*EC and have a positive balance; 
consumer surpluses decrease by the area pe
*pi
*BC; and total surpluses (producer and 
consumer) decrease by the area CFAB. 
(b) Land use in quantity (q) / land (l) space. The land use functions Li under intensive farming 
and Le under extensive farming represent how much land is used with each farming method to 
produce any given quantity. Based on the equilibrium quantity qe
* = qi
*, the equilibrium land 
use is li
* with intensive farming and le
* with extensive farming.  
(c) Biodiversity conservation in biodiversity (B) / land (l) space. The figure represents three 
possible biodiversity functions for extensive farming depending on the trade-off between 
biodiversity and yield (see Table 1): Be if no biodiversity is conserved on land farmed 
extensively, Be
l in the linear case, B̅e
 if all biodiversity is conserved on land farmed 
extensively. Based on the equilibrium land use le
*, the equilibrium biodiversity level with 
extensive farming is Be
*, Be
l* and B̅e in each of these three cases. If land is farmed intensively, 
the equilibrium amount of biodiversity conservation Bi
* does not depends on the biodiversity 
function, and is determined by the biodiversity function Bi (coinciding with Be) based on the 






Figure 4. Equilibrium with perfectly elastic demand 
 
Legend: Changes relative to Figure 3. (a) Market equilibrium. The demand function D is 
perfectly elastic (a price level occurs for which the quantity demanded is infinite under the 
condition g = 0), with c = 2/3. Under extensive farming in equilibrium, quantity is qe
*, price is 
pe
* = pi
*, and producer surplus is 0pe
*EF. Compared with intensive farming, the producer 
surplus decreases by the area EFAB under extensive farming. 
(c) The biodiversity function B represents a convex relationship between biodiversity and 
yield such that in equilibrium, both farming systems yield the same level of biodiversity 
(Be(le
*) = Bi(li
*)). This equality is obtained for a convexity corresponding to ᾶ = 0.19 in the 




Figure 5. Simulations of biodiversity levels under extensive vs. intensive farming depending 
on the degree of convexity of the biodiversity-yield relationship 
 
Legend: This figure gives the distribution of B / Bi = (Be – Bi) / Bi, the percent variation of 
biodiversity when farming is extensive rather than intensive, in simulations performed with 
varying values of supply and demand elasticities and varying degrees of convexity of the 
biodiversity-yield relationship (40 simulations for each degree of convexity of the 
biodiversity-yield relationship, as drawn in (b) and (c), and 400 simulations in total, as drawn 
in (a)). The mean m and standard deviation s of the percent biodiversity change are as follows: 
(a) in all simulations, m =  1.1% and s = 6.1%; (b) in simulations where f(90%) = 2% (high 
degree of convexity of the biodiversity-yield relationship), m =  7.4% and s = 2.8%; and (c) 
in simulations where f(90%) = 8% (lower degree of convexity of the biodiversity-yield 
relationship), m = 5.3% and s = 2.7%. Similar to the previously presented illustrations, we 
normalize the equilibrium with intensive farming to pi
* = 1/2 and qi
* = 2/3. For each 
simulation, the slopes and intercepts of the inverse intensive supply and demand, b, c, ai and 
g, are calculated to obtain the equilibrium pi
* = 1/2 and qi
* = 2/3 based on a supply elasticity 
si = pi* / (ai qi*)  {0.09, 0.14}, demand elasticity d = - pi* / (g qi*)  {0.07, 0.03} and 
equilibrium relation pi
* = ai qi
* – b = c – g qi
*. By assumption, under extensive farming, the 
yield is ye = 0.9 and the biodiversity function is f(0.9) = 1 – 0.9
α. The assumption that 
α  [0, 1) is equivalent to 0.9 < 0.9α ≤ 1, or 0 ≤ 1 – 0.9α < 0.1, or equivalent to 
0 ≤ f(ye) < 10%. Simulations are performed with ten equidistant values for f(ye) between 1% 
and 9%. From equation (5), ai < ae. Based on the assumption that land use is higher with 
extensive farming rather than intensive farming, g + ai > (g + ae) ye (from Proposition 1) or ae 
< ae
L, where ae
L = (g + ai) / ye – g. Therefore, the extensive supply slope has to check ai < ae 
< ae
L. We use ten equidistant values for ae between 1.1ai and 0.9 ae






Figure 6. Equilibrium with land-use zoning 
 
 
Legend: Equilibria with intensive farming [(a) to (c)] and extensive farming [(d) to (f)] are 
represented similarly to that in Figure 3. Only the case of a linear trade-off between 
biodiversity and yield is represented in (c) and (f). Without regulation, the intensive 
equilibrium is characterized by price pi
* and quantity qi
* at A (a), land use li
* (b) and 
biodiversity level Bi




* (e) and Be
* (f). With land-use zoning, the minimum cap on biodiversity is 
represented in (c) and (f) by the thick vertical line (thus, the dotted portions of the straight 
lines representing the trade-off between biodiversity and land use no longer apply). Such 
zoning imposes a cap on land use lic with intensive farming and lec with extensive farming. 
This cap on land use is equivalent to a maximum production quota qc ((b) and (e)). The 
market equilibrium is at the intersection of the demand curve and the thick vertical line 
representing the production restriction, i.e., at point C with intensive farming (a) and at point 
F with extensive farming (d). Under both farming systems, the equilibrium agricultural price 
(pic for intensive farming, and pec for extensive farming) is higher than the equilibrium 
marginal cost of production (mcic for intensive farming, and mcec for extensive farming). 
Incentives to encroach on conservation zones are higher for intensive than extensive farming 





Figure 7 Demand for food, feed, and biofuel goods  
 
Legend: Demand functions in quantity / price space. Total demand (D) is the horizontal sum 
of the biofuel demand (Db), feed demand (Df) and food demand (DF). Because the demand for 
biofuel is less price elastic than the demand for food (which is less price elastic than the 
demand for feed), Db has a higher slope than DF, which in turn has a higher slope than Df. The 
equilibrium price is pe
* under extensive farming and pi
* (lower) under intensive farming. For 
both farming systems and for each good, the equilibrium consumption level is determined by 
the intersection of the demand function, with the dotted line representing the equilibrium price 
level. Compared with intensive farming, extensive farming is characterized by a lower 
consumption level for each of the three goods. The decrease in consumption is higher for feed 
than for food and higher for food than for biofuel. The decrease in consumption is so small for 
biofuel, given the price inelasticity of its demand, that it is not possible to distinguish the ticks 
indicating the equilibrium levels of biofuel consumption with intensive and extensive farming 
in this figure. 
